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Science is cruder [than philosophy], more directly useful, more intimate to our 
lives, more embedded in our errors of perception and so harder to eradicate from 
the mind. 
—William Carlos Williams, Imaginations, 305 
 William Carlos Williams’ poetry is preoccupied with the mundane objects of Rutherford, 
New Jersey: a firetruck or a red wheelbarrow glazed with rain. Willard (1965) calls Williams a 
“poet of things” whose chief “desire [is] to create poetry based on the careful examination of 
concreate things as a way to attain poetic truth” (p. 311). His poetry is characterized by a sense 
of sensual and emotional immediacy, which aims to achieve contact with a world of objects, and 
Williams states that he takes “contact to mean… man with nothing but the thing and the feeling 
of that thing” (Ramazani, Ellmann, & O’Clair, 2003, p. 285). Simply put, Williams seeks to 
linguistically represent objects as they actually are, to offer representations that resemble the 
referent as closely as possible.  
Critics such as Easterbrook (1994) have argued that Williams’ goal is ultimately futile: 
the divide between linguistic representations and experiences of a thing-itself remains 
unbridgeable. Easterbrook (1994) writes, “The ‘core’ [of the object] is recognized as a myth… 
not simply one of the ‘many disguises’ poetry has taken up” (p. 40). While most explanations of 
Williams’ work rely on biographical accounts or philosophical theory, recent developments in 
cognitive neuroscience, namely Martin’s (2016) grounded representations in action, perception, 
 
 
and emotion systems (GRAPES) model for the cognitive representation of object properties and 
concepts, lends support for Williams successfully recreating the experiences of things 
linguistically. His poem “The Great Figure” exemplifies the ways Williams’ poetry fit into the 
GRAPES model. Moreover, Oakey (2015) suggests that Williams’ poetry acts as an 
epistemology to understand the world. His notion “no ideas but in things” (Ramazani et al., 
2003, p. 286) ultimately corresponds to Hayes and Kraemer’s (2017) description of the benefits 
of grounding abstract concepts in the tangible. “The Red Wheelbarrow” demonstrates Williams’ 
use of concrete objects to convey abstract ideas. Ultimately, insights from empirical cognitive-
neuroscientific research provide a novel understanding of William Carlos William’s “poetry of 
things.”  
 Typically, critics evaluate Williams’ poetry and its ability to represent the experience of 
things through biographical details or rationalist musings linked to philosophical theory. Perkins 
(1976) explains Williams’ poetics through biographical information, and attributes much of his 
style to his profession as a physician: “part of his theory of poetry—for example, the emphasis 
he placed on immediacy and spontaneity—were motivated, among other considerations, by the 
need of a busy doctor to justify a type of poetry he had time to write” (p. 545). While 
biographical details undoubtedly offer insights into the origin of Williams’ style, they do little to 
address the ability of his verse achieve his goal of recreating the experience of a thing.  
Similarly, critics rely on rationalistic philosophy to determine the efficacy of Williams’ 
verse. For instance, Easterbrook (1994) writes, “Descartes’s mind-body dilemma does not differ 
from Williams’s word-thing problem” (p. 36), and Frye (1989) states, “One of these [ontological 
reassurances] is that the artist's relation to nature is not causal; Williams' poems become sullen in 
the company of Edmund Husserl's phenomenological applications” (p. 12). These critics apply 
 
 
previous philosophical ideas to Williams’ poetry in order to understand its effect on the reader. 
Their conclusions of Williams’ efficacy—Easterbrook suggests failure while Frye implies 
success—stem from their own musings, and do not rest on empirical support. While their tactics 
shed light on Williams’ work and the traditions from which it stems, their methods rely on strict 
rationalism and thoughts of human experiences, instead of empirical studies the impact of 
linguistic representations of an object on our experiences.  
Although empirical scientific research is seldom used as a lens for literary criticism, the 
GRAPES model for neural representations of object properties, proposed by Martin (2016), 
elucidates and ultimately supports Williams’ success in capturing the experience of an object 
through verse. The GRAPES model depicts how “mental representations become connected to 
the things they refer to in the world” and suggests a structure for neural representations of 
concept primitives, universal object-associated properties, such as color, physical form, the way 
a thing moves, and the affective response associated with the thing (Martin, 2016, p. 980). 
According to the GRAPES model, the brain stores these concept primitives as a distributed 
representation across our perception, action, and emotion systems, and a growing body of 
neuroimaging data supports the model’s claims. For instance, neuroimaging data finds that 
neural activity increases in brain regions associated with color perception when participants were 
asked to name a color associated with an object (“yellow” when prompted with “pencil”). 
Similarly, brain regions associated with motion perception responded with increased activity in 
response to naming an object-associated action (“write” when prompted with “pencil”). This 
overlap of neural activity when accessing object-property information and when 
perceiving/sensing an object suggests that the processes related to concepts and 
sensation/perception are emmeshed. In addition to areas associated with color and motion 
 
 
perception activating while accessing object concepts, areas associated with taste activate when 
participants are presented with images of appetizing food. This data suggests that Williams’ 
linguistically image-rich verse triggers conceptual primitives of the objects he seeks to represent. 
Moreover, importantly for Williams’ poetics, conceptual primitives can be accessed through a 
variety of modalities: “information about how dogs look is accessed automatically when we hear 
a bark, or when we read or hear the word ‘dog’” (Martin, 2016, p. 980.)  In many ways, the 
GRAPES model suggests that Williams achieves his goal of contact and provides “the thing and 
the feeling of that thing.”  
Despite the similarities in activation, Martin (2016) does not suggest that accessing 
conceptual primitives is the same as actually experiencing or perceiving an object. Moreover, 
while proponents of grounded cognition believe and argue that stored object-concept information 
is formatted in a depictive, iconic, modality-specific way, current neuroimaging techniques 
cannot rule out the possibility of abstract, language-like representations that are merely 
interactive with action, perception, and emotion systems. Nonetheless, despite the continued 
debate of the format of cognitive primitives’ representations, the GRAPES model still asserts 
Williams’ poetry as achieving its goal of most closely representing the experience of a thing. His 
words activate conceptual primitives, which are represented across the brain areas associated 
with action, perception, and emotion—the basic aspects of the thing.  
Williams’ poem “The Great Figure” (see Appendix A) exemplifies his recreations of the 
experience of an object, and demonstrates how his poetry accesses cognitive primitives to elicit 
object-associated responses in the reader. He begins with images of “rain” and “lights.” 
Williams’ clear language is free of specifiers or flowery verbiage, and instead of adjectives to 
describe the night, he employs nouns to evoke the conceptual primitive of rain and lights, 
 
 
according to the GRAPES model their form and feeling.  The “figure 5 / in gold” is separated 
from its semantic meaning. Normally “5” refers to a specific cluster of objects, but here he 
presents “the figure 5”—using its visual symbol instead of alphabetic representation—to evoke 
its shape and bring us close to the experience of the thing. Because 5 is not associated with a 
color, he provides the thing’s hue: “gold.”  He adds context to the figure: “on a red / firetruck.” 
Again, his language is simple, the bare-bones description being enough, the GRAPES model 
suggests, to elicit neural responses associated with a firetruck’s object properties. The inclusion 
of superfluous modifiers and metaphors would only further remove the poem from the 
experience of the referent by adding unnecessary layers of abstraction to the representation, noise 
and static in the activation of conceptual primitives.  
Williams continues with linguistic representations of motion (“moving / tense / 
unheeded”), and again, the GRAPES model suggests these action words trigger neural activity in 
the brain region associated with motion perception. He further adds representations of auditory 
stimuli: “gong clangs / siren howls.” Just as pictures of musical instruments produce increased 
activity in audition-perception regions (Martin, 2016), so too does his auditory imagery. 
Importantly, Williams’ pared-down descriptions evoke a visceral, emotional response, one of 
urgency and danger. The GRAPES model suggests this arises from a distributed representation 
of the object properties across the emotional system, as well as perceptual and action systems. 
Simply put, the GRAPES model supports that Williams’ poetics accurately represent the 
experience of a thing on a neural level. 
 In addition to his chief goal of recreating the experience of a thing, critics have asserted 
that Williams viewed his poetry as way of gathering information about the world, his poems 
“epistemologically motivated” (Oakey, 2015, p. 199). Oakey (2015) writes, “Epistemology was 
 
 
not just an incidental concern for Williams… but rather explicitly shaped the way his poems 
configured relationships between subject and object, and established the poem as an arena of 
knowledge formation” (p. 199). Williams’ famous assertion “no ideas but in things” (Ramazani 
et al., 2003, p. 285) lies at the center of his epistemology of using poetry to gather and convey 
information about the world, and “grounded” theories of cognitive representations of abstract 
concepts, namely Martin (2016) and Hayes and Kraemer (2017), support Williams’ tactic of 
using the tangible to convey the abstract.  
 Simply put, the GRAPES model suggests that even abstract concepts are “grounded”—
ultimately represented—in action, perception, and emotion systems in the brain; therefore, 
abstract concepts such as bravery or peril are represented through tangible object properties 
similar to those of, for instance, a firetruck (Martin, 2016). Hayes and Kraemer (2017) 
demonstrate the utility of grounding abstract concepts, specifically scientific concepts such as 
mechanical force, in body-centered metaphors to illustrate the concept bolsters our ability to 
learn those concepts. While their article only discusses the efficacy of grounded cognitions in 
conveying abstract concepts from science, their findings may be applied while evaluating the 
efficacy of Williams’ “poetry of things” to convey abstract ideas.  
 Williams’ “The Red Wheelbarrow” (see Appendix B) provides a prime example of the 
way Williams represents abstract ideas through quotidian and concrete objects. He begins with 
ambiguity and moves towards the tangible: “so much depends / upon // a red wheel / barrow.” 
What “much” refers to remains distant and open to possibilities. Taken simply, Williams 
suggests that “so much” of rural life depends on simple tools, such as a wheelbarrow. However, 
the lack of an antecedent for “much” allows for nonliteral interpretations, and the poem can be 
read as a metaphor for poetry. Williams suggests that the entirety of the poem relies on the “red 
 
 
wheel / barrow // glazed with rain / water // besides the white / chickens.” Instead of using 
indirect and flowery language to convey his insight on the importance of the poetic image, 
Williams opts for tangible objects to ground the abstract literary concept in the concrete and 
visceral, just as Hayes and Kraemer (2017) suggest doing with abstract scientific concepts.  
Simply put, empirical neuroscientific research sheds light on Williams’ ability to 
represent the experience of a thing and convey abstract ideas about literature through imagery of 
the concrete world. Importantly, these insights exemplify the importance of novel analytical 
lenses in understanding the impacts of literature on our minds and underscore the necessity of 
interdisciplinary approaches across traditionally disparate fields. Siloed information proves 
detrimental to our ultimate understanding of any given topic, no matter how niche. Attempts at 
understanding the impact of Williams’ poetry, a pediatrician’s verse that strayed from 
contemporary literary convention, provides a prime example of the importance of these 
interdisciplinary approaches and their benefits.  
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Appendix A 
The Great Figure 
Among the rain  
and lights  
I saw the figure 5  
in gold  
on a red  
firetruck  
moving  
tense  
unheeded  
to gong clangs  
siren howls  
and wheels rumbling  
through the dark city. 
 
(Williams, 1951, p. 230) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
The Red Wheelbarrow 
 
so much depends 
upon 
 
a red wheel 
barrow 
 
glazed with rain 
water 
 
beside the white 
chickens 
 
(Williams, 1951, p. 277) 
 
